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Trust: A Model for Disclosure in Patent Law* 
ARI EZRA WALDMAN† 
How to draw the line between public and private is a foundational, first-principles 
question of privacy law, but the answer has implications for intellectual property, as 
well. This project is one in a series of papers about first-person disclosures of infor-
mation in the privacy and intellectual property law contexts, and it defines the bound-
ary between public and nonpublic information through the lens of social science 
—namely, principles of trust.  
Patent law’s public use bar confronts the question of whether legal protection 
should extend to information previously disclosed to a small group of people. I pre-
sent evidence that shows that current application of the public use bar privileges the 
confidentiality and control norms of industry while minimizing those no less strong 
norms common to lone entrepreneurs. This results in a general pattern: corporate 
inventors tend to win their public use cases; solo entrepreneurs tend to lose them. As 
a result, the public use bar has unintended negative effects, including discouraging 
experimentation and discriminating against inventors without the financial backing 
of corporate employers. These results are the direct effects of how courts determine 
the difference between public and nonpublic uses. 
This project proposes a new way of talking about, thinking through, and deter-
mining when previous disclosures bar subsequent patentability. In short, I argue that 
invention disclosures in contexts of trust retain their legal protection despite any 
ostensible loss of control or lack of formal confidentiality agreements. This proposal 
respects social network differences and will advance the goals of patent law and 
increase access to the innovation economy for all persons. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A variety of claims depend on whether information previously disclosed to an-
other is still legally protectable as private. For example, a victim of nonconsensual 
pornography, commonly known as “revenge porn,” may sue for public disclosure of 
private facts.1 But the success of her claim hinges on whether she retains a privacy 
interest in a picture that she may have voluntarily texted to another.2 A Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the admission of a defendant’s cell site data at trial may 
fail because previous disclosure of that data to the phone company extinguishes the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.3 And, in certain cases, retention of 
attorney-client privilege after a disclosure to a third party depends on whether the 
third party was truly an unrelated member of the public or a close ally in litigation.4 
The boundary between public and private is a foundational question of privacy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 357–59 (2014) (noting the possibility of nonconsensual pornogra-
phy victims using the tort of public disclosure of private facts, but also highlighting the barriers 
to success for victims using tort law); see also Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting 
“Revenge Porn,” 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 713 (2017) (proposing the use of the tort of breach 
of confidentiality in some revenge porn cases). 
 2. See Mary Anne Franks, Combatting Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working Paper 
(Sept. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2336537 [https://perma.cc/P5V7-MDHS]. 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 507–09, 511–12 (11th Cir. 2015); In 
re Application of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602–03 (5th Cir. 
2013). But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(concurring in the result holding that GPS tracking on public streets was a Fourth Amendment 
search and arguing that it is “necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”). 
 4. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921–22 (2d Cir. 1961) (recognizing that 
disclosure to a nonlawyer could still permit protection of the privilege in limited 
circumstances). 
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law.5 But the question of when information remains legally protectable despite pre-
vious disclosure is not the exclusive realm of those writing about privacy; intellectual 
property lawyers have an interest in this fight, as well.  
Section 102 of the Patent Act, as amended recently by the America Invents Act 
(AIA), states that an invention “in public use” or “disclosed” or “otherwise available 
to the public” for more than one year prior to filing an application for the patent will 
not be considered novel and, thus, not eligible for a patent.6 What is a public use 
under the Patent Act, then, depends on drawing the line between public and private.  
And where we draw the line matters: In 2008, the last year of AstraZeneca’s patent 
on Prilosec, for example, the company reported more than $800 million in sales7 after 
beating back claims that its patent was invalid for prepatenting public use.8 Public 
use bar cases have also determined ownership over multimillion dollar products like 
the Rubik’s Cube, which has sold more than 350 million units since 1980.9 In addi-
tion to helping determine the fate of millions of dollars in revenue, the public use 
bar’s application defines the boundaries of experimentation, which could mean the 
difference between functioning and nonfunctioning widgets, drugs, and machines. 
This Article bridges a gap between privacy and intellectual property scholarship 
and proposes a conceptual and practical framework for determining when a previ-
ously disclosed invention is still patentable. In short, it depends on social network 
norms and relationships of trust: when the relationship between the parties is charac-
terized by trust and expectations of confidentiality, information disclosed should re-
main protected. 
Currently, public use case law links publicness with the inventor’s loss of control 
over her invention prior to patenting.10 In this way, one of the dominant conventional 
theories of privacy11—privacy as the right to control what others know about you—is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Although the full breadth of the privacy literature in this area is too extensive to list 
here, several works collect and analyze the scholarship well. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, 
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 
(2000); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–126 (2002); 
Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, 
69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 565–88 (2015). 
 6. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012). Fortunately, the current § 102(a) closely tracks the 
language of the pre-AIA § 102(b). Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same Thing 
It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1123–35 (2015). Many patent scholars have also 
proposed new approaches to the public use bar. See, e.g., Katherine E. White, A General Rule 
of Law Is Needed To Define Public Use in Patent Cases, 88 KY. L.J. 423 (2000).  
 7. Jack Neff, P&G’s Hold on Prilosec OTC Extended to 2008, ADVERT. AGE (July 26, 
2006), http://adage.com/article/news/p-g-s-hold-prilosec-otc-extended-2008/110431/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2B4K-WENL]. 
 8. In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1371–75 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 9. Luke Villapaz, Rubik’s Cube 40th Anniversary: 9 Facts Behind the Famous 3-D Toy 
Puzzle, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2014, 4:28 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/rubiks-cube-40th 
-anniversary-9-facts-behind-famous-3-d-toy-puzzle-1576562 [https://perma.cc/KE78-2UEG]. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 22–36. 
 11. Privacy-as-control is a dominant theory in privacy scholarship. See, e.g., JULIE C. 
INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56–57 (1992); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND 
FREEDOM 7 (1967); Jean L. Cohen, The Necessity of Privacy, 68 SOC. RES. 318, 319 (2001); 
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 484 (1968). Elsewhere, I have argued that although 
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reflected in patent law’s novelty jurisprudence. This theory is an affirmative right 
located within the individual that embraces principles of autonomy and choice. It 
separates the private and public worlds with retention and loss of control over infor-
mation, respectively. 
As a means of determining the extent of personal privacy rights, a doctrine based 
on control and secrecy is problematic. Its bright-line rule extinguishes our privacy 
interests when any third party knows something about us, an increasingly common 
phenomenon in a networked world.12 And it allows others to encroach on spheres we 
would normally consider private.13 Similarly, as a means of determining the differ-
ence between public and nonpublic uses and disclosures under the Patent Act, the 
notion of control discourages experimentation and innovation and frustrates the goals 
of patent law generally. As implemented, the standard is also discriminatory. It privi-
leges wealthy and corporate inventors over other innovators by relying too heavily 
on executed confidentiality agreements and the confidentiality norms of corporate 
actors. As a result, by disrespecting how many entrepreneurs commonly interact with 
others, the public use bar entrenches wealthy interests and excludes other entrepre-
neurs from the innovation economy. 
Relying on research into social networks and interpersonal trust, this Article pro-
poses a new way of talking about, thinking through, and determining when previous 
disclosures bar subsequent patentability. I argue that disclosures in networks charac-
terized by trust retain their privacy interests despite any ostensible loss of control or 
lack of formal confidentiality agreements. I have called this proposal “privacy-as-
trust,” and I apply it from the privacy context to the public use bar. Trust, defined as 
a resource of social capital between or among two or more persons concerning the 
expectations that other members of their community will behave according to ac-
cepted norms,14 is the defining feature of social interaction.15 It is, I have argued, the 
catalyst for an individual’s decision to disclose otherwise private information.16 Be-
cause we share when we trust and because trust is a contextual social phenomenon, 
it makes intuitive sense to distinguish between public and private uses or disclosures 
along these lines using a totality of the circumstances test. 
                                                                                                                 
 
conceptualizations of privacy vary wildly, the conventional wisdom is really two sides of the 
same coin. For some, the private world represents freedom from society; for others, privacy 
gives us the individual freedom for autonomous lives of free choice. All are based on the same 
respect for the individual as the locus of the privacy right, and all are burdened by limitations: 
some are overinclusive, while others are underinclusive; some are too elastic, while others are 
egregiously rigid. See Waldman, supra note 5, at 565–88. 
 12. Solove has called this the “secrecy paradigm.” DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42–47, 143–49 (2004). 
 13. Id. at 42–43, 143. 
 14. Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner, Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on 
the Social Determinants of Economic Action, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1320, 1332 (1993). 
 15. See J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as a Social Reality, 63 SOC. FORCES 
967, 969 (1985). 
 16. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726929 
[https://perma.cc/M2PU-RR7E] (presenting quantitative data showing that trust is a key, 
statistically significant factor in individuals’ decision to share personal information on 
Facebook). 
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Applying privacy-as-trust to the public use context has several advantages: it is 
egalitarian, flexible, practical, and faithful to the policy objectives of patent law. By 
respecting the confidentiality norms of different social groups, privacy-as-trust 
would help rebalance public use jurisprudence among all types of inventors. It is also 
flexible enough to accommodate myriad different social contexts, many of which are 
characterized by such strong notions of confidentiality that formal agreements are 
unnecessary. The standard is also administrable on a case-by-case basis, offering 
clear opportunities for the admission of evidence of expectations of social network 
confidentiality alongside myriad other cues of nonpublic disclosure. And it will ad-
vance the policy goals of patent law by protecting inventors’ rights, encouraging ex-
perimentation, and freeing up public information for future use.  
What’s more, this proposal is not as radical as it seems. Social network theory and 
trust are already at play throughout intellectual property law. We see respect for so-
cial networks in patent law’s enablement requirement, which is defined relative to 
someone of “ordinary skill in the art”17 of the invention. Copyright law’s originality 
requirement is genre specific, recognizing that originality and creativity mean differ-
ent things for different cultural artifacts. And trademark law accepts that two com-
panies can use similar marks as long their products, marketing channels, and con-
sumer markets remain in separate networks. Trade secret law goes even further.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys and analyzes public use case 
law and makes two related arguments. First, that control over information has so far 
been the dominant standard for determining when prepatenting disclosures implicate 
the public use bar. Second, as implemented, the standard discriminates against 
noncorporate entrepreneurs by privileging the confidentiality norms of corporate ac-
tors over the distinct norms and practices of other social networks. This section also 
criticizes the logical failure of a disclosure standard that ignores the relationships 
between the parties involved. To resolve that central failure, Part II proposes a new 
standard. Using social networks theory and social science evidence on information 
flow and trust, this Article argues that privacy-as-trust is a fair and administrable way 
to draw the line between public and nonpublic first-person disclosures in patent law. 
The doctrine holds that information disclosed in a context of trust, based on network-
specific norms of confidentiality, custom, and the entirety of the social context of 
disclosure, is not public and, thus, is still protectable as private. This Part concludes 
by showing the advantages of this proposal. Part III returns to several of the public 
use cases discussed in Part I and applies privacy-as-trust to these real contexts. Some-
times, though not always, results would change under the new standard; in all cases, 
privacy-as-trust is fair, egalitarian, and loyal to the goals of patent law. I respond to 
several anticipated objections and conclude with recommendations for future 
research. 
I. PATENT LAW’S DENIAL OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS  
To get a patent, your invention must be novel. To be novel, it cannot have been 
in public use, disclosed, or otherwise available to the public more than one year prior 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (2012).  
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to patenting.18 The purposes of the public use bar are noble ones: to incentivize 
prompt disclosure, to discourage inventors from commercializing their products 
while keeping prior art out of the public domain, to give inventors a reasonable 
amount of time to determine the market for their products, and to protect the public 
domain.19 If, as several leading patent scholars have argued,20 the recent America 
Invents Act amendments do not change the meaning of the novelty requirement, 
patent law’s publicity triggers will continue to be based either on a secrecy para-
digm21 or, in the case of the public use bar, on the extent to which an inventor retains 
control over her invention during prepatenting use.  
In practice, however, the public use rule—that loss of control means public use 
—generally overemphasizes the importance of formal confidentiality agreements 
and commonly ignores the confidentiality norms of noncorporate and noncontractual 
social relationships. As such, the public use bar privileges corporate, wealthy, and 
established inventors for whom contracts and nondisclosure agreements come easily. 
And it makes it difficult for other types of entrepreneurs to test and market their 
inventions.  
In this section, I summarize the law of public use, show how similar it is to one 
of the dominant theories of privacy, and then show its uneven application using a 
series of illustrative public use cases. I conclude with a short discussion of how cur-
rent application of the public use bar tends to institutionalize corporate privilege and 
limits entrepreneurs’ access to the innovation economy. 
A. The Public Use Bar and Privacy-as-Control 
Federal Circuit case law states that lack of control is the shibboleth of public use: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012).  
 19. Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Kimberly-Clark 
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also, e.g., Nancy S. 
Paik, Implied Professional Obligation of Confidentiality Sufficient To Overcome Public Use 
Defense to a Claim of Patent Infringement? Bernhardt v. Collezione - The Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ Surprising Recent Announcement on the Public Use Bar, 4 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 332, 333–34 (2005). 
 20. See Lemley, supra note 6; Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023 (2012). 
 21. See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 42–47 (introducing, describing, and ultimately critiqu-
ing the “secrecy paradigm” in privacy jurisprudence). The “secrecy paradigm” is evident in 
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 102(a) of the Patent Act of 1952 in that anything not 
secret is public. As the court stated recently in In re Enhanced Security Research, LLC, § 102 
has always been interpreted “broadly.” 739 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “[E]ven rela-
tively obscure documents,” like a single copy of a graduate thesis buried in a German univer-
sity library, “qualify as prior art so long as the public has a means of accessing them.” Id. 
(citing In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). The Federal Circuit made a similar 
conclusion in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., where it found that the process for 
rapidly stretching Teflon without it breaking was publicly used even though it was only used 
inside Gore’s shop.  721 F.2d 1540, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983). And, of course, the famous and 
oft-cited Egbert v. Lipmann, which held that a woman was publicly using a corset invented by 
her fiancé even though she was wearing the only prototype under her clothes, is a paradigmatic 
example of the secrecy paradigm, as well. 104 U.S. 333, 335 (1881). 
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a public use occurs when an inventor allows others to use her invention without re-
taining control over the device.22 In a nod to the connection between public use and 
privacy, the court has noted that control depends on whether the inventor retained a 
“legitimate expectation of privacy and of confidentiality.”23 Like privacy questions, 
then, public use claims require judges to determine when an expectation of privacy 
exists. And like an individual’s expectations of privacy, whether an inventor retained 
control over her invention is supposed to be based on a variety of nondeterminative 
factors. In the public use context, those factors include: what the inventor did to share 
her invention, the public’s access to and knowledge of the invention, whether the 
inventor imposed confidentiality obligations on those present,24 and evidence of ex-
perimentation.25 The one factor ostensibly focused on the relationship between the 
inventor and the public—the presence of confidentiality or secrecy obligations—is 
supposed to be flexible: a formal nondisclosure agreement is not required.26 As we 
shall see, that flexibility is unevenly applied. 
Experimental use, which is supposed to negate a finding of public use, is also 
determined via a variety of factors, including the number of prototypes being tested, 
the duration of those tests, the existence of records and secrecy agreements, compen-
sation, and retention of control by the inventor.27 That the multifactor tests overlap 
is telling. Public use is most appropriately determined in context on a case-by-case 
basis because each disclosure occurs in a unique set of circumstances.28 
But at the core of public use law is the control the inventor retains over her inven-
tion. And an inventor’s choice to give up control is the salient factor in nudging a 
court toward a finding of public use. The Supreme Court made this clear in 1877. In 
Elizabeth v. Pavement Co.,29 the Court stated that as long as an inventor “does not 
voluntarily allow others to make [the invention] and use it, and so long as it is not on 
sale for general use, he keeps the invention under his own control, and does not lose 
his title to a patent.”30 This cause-and-effect relationship between voluntary disclo-
sure and erosion of control is the hallmark of modern public use law, as well.  
In Lough v. Brunswick Corp.,31 for example, the Federal Circuit invalidated a 
patent for boat motor seals because the inventor gave away his invention, installed it 
on another’s boat, and failed to keep track of the test boat’s operation with the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (find-
ing nonpublic use because the inventor had at all times “retained control” over the device 
during prepatenting demonstrations). 
 23. Id. at 1265. 
 24. Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 25. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (Prost, J., concurring). 
 26. Moleculon Research Corp., 793 F.2d  at 1266. 
 27. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing TP Labs. v. 
Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 28. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT (2010) (information flows are subject 
to contextual norms that vary from context to context); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as 
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004) (same). 
 29. 97 U.S. 126 (1877). 
 30. Id. at 135. 
 31. 86 F.3d 1113. 
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installed prototype.32 In Beachcombers International, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative 
Products,33 a designer lost her patent for a new kaleidoscope because she chose to 
demonstrate the invention for party guests and allowed them to handle and use it.34 
And in Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Laboratories,35 an inventor lost control of 
his invention (and thus lost his patent) not only because he demonstrated his new 
centrifuge for others, but also because he allowed a free flow of bodies through his 
lab that housed the device.36 In these and many other cases, the Federal Circuit took 
away patents because inventors had voluntarily given over their inventions to others 
and, in so doing, made the decision to give up control over their devices. 
In this way, patent law’s public use bar reflects one of the dominant conceptuali-
zations of privacy: privacy as choice and control. This is the theory that a right to 
privacy means having the right to control one’s personal information and the freedom 
to decide to share it with some and not others. The paradigm is pervasive, evident in 
leading works of privacy scholarship and a multitude of privacy cases. And the lan-
guage scholars and judges use to describe privacy is reminiscent of the Federal 
Circuit’s discussion of public use and control. 
Privacy-as-control scholars could just as easily be speaking about individuals con-
cerned about their privacy as inventors disclosing their devices. For instance, Jean 
Cohen has argued that privacy is the right “to choose whether, when, and with 
whom” to share intimate information.37 Alan Westin suggests that privacy “is the 
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, 
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”38 It is, to 
Julie Inness, the idea that an individual has “control over a realm of intimacy”39 and, 
to Jonathan Zittrain, control over our information in general.40 For the philosopher 
Steve Matthews, exercising privacy is making the choice to “control” and “manage” 
the boundary between ourselves and others.41 The common denominator in all these 
descriptions is free choice and control, and it is the same dynamic at play in cases 
like Elizabeth, Lough, Beachcombers, and Baxter, just with different information. 
Privacy-as-control is also evident in the current interpretation of the tort of public 
disclosure of private facts.42 Here, too, the comparison to public use analysis is strik-
ing. Although the tort’s often uneven application has spawned much debate and 
scholarship,43 an individual tends to lose control and, thus, a privacy interest, in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Id. at 1121. 
 33. 31 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 34. Id. at 1159–60. 
 35. 88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 36. Id. at 1058–59. 
 37. Cohen, supra note 11, at 319. 
 38. WESTIN, supra note 11, at 7. 
 39. INNESS, supra note 11, at 56. 
 40. Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property 
and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2000) (“In my 
view, there is a profound relationship between those who wish to protect intellectual property 
and those who wish to protect privacy.”). 
 41. Steve Matthews, Anonymity and the Social Self, 47 AM. PHIL. Q. 351, 351 (2010). 
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 43. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. 
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information once she has voluntarily divulged it to another or once the information 
is already publicly available.44 Like Oliver Sipple, who could not prevent the media 
from disclosing his sexual orientation after he had already disclosed it to friends in 
San Francisco,45 and like Ralph Nader, who could not prevent General Motors from 
gathering personal information already known to others as part of the company’s plot 
to discredit him,46 the inventors in Lough, Beachcombers, and Baxter could not put 
the cat back in the bag. Their inventions, either from voluntary disclosures (Lough 
and Beachcombers)47 or public availability (Baxter),48 were already out of their con-
trol and known and used by others. 
B. The Uneven Application of the Public Use Bar 
It seems evident, then, that the law of public use reflects the dynamics of privacy-
as-control. That itself is problematic because it creates the potential for what Daniel 
Solove has called a “secrecy paradigm” to govern what should be a more flexible, 
case-by-case standard. In privacy law, the secrecy paradigm refers to the erroneous 
conflation of privacy and secrecy: it creates a bright-line rule that something is pri-
vate if it is secret, but if it is known to even one other person, it is no longer secret 
and, thus, not protectable as private.49 It is at play all over the privacy spectrum, from 
tort law50 to the Fourth Amendment.51  
                                                                                                                 
 
REV. 919 (2005); Waldman, supra note 5. 
 44. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(finding that disclosure of Sipple’s sexual orientation to a group of people extinguished his 
privacy interests in the information upon subsequent disclosure to the broader public); Nader 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970) (“Information about the plaintiff 
which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as private . . . .”); Killilea v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 499 N.E.2d 1291, 1295 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (“There is no liability 
when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that . . . 
the plaintiff leaves open to the public . . . .”). But see, e.g., Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 
795 S.W.2d 488, 501–02 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that voluntarily attending a social 
gathering at a hospital with media in attendance did not vitiate privacy interest in family’s 
decision to use in vitro fertilization). 
 45. Sipple, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 668–69.  
 46. Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 770 (including information gleaned from interviews with friends 
and acquaintances). 
 47. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding public use 
when inventor “provided the seal assemblies to friends . . . .”); Beachcombers Int’l, Inc. v. 
WildeWood Creative Prods., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding public use when 
inventor voluntarily gave her kaleidoscope to party guests). 
 48. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1056, 1058–59 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(finding that the inventor showed others how the centrifuge worked and permitted free flow 
through his lab, allowing all who passed to see the device). 
 49. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 42–47, 143–49. 
 50. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 51. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735, 742 (1979) (finding that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers captured by pen register); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–43 (1976) (finding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in bank records). The Third Party Doctrine, spawned by Miller, Smith, and their progeny, re-
566 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:557 
 
It helps explain several public use cases, as well. In Lough, the inventor showed 
his device to five friends, who used it on their boats.52 And in the classic case of 
Egbert v. Lippmann,53 the Supreme Court stated that an “intimate friend” wearing a 
corset under her clothes constituted public use: “If an inventor . . . gives or sells it to 
another, to be used by the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or in-
junction of secrecy, and it is so used, such use is public, even though the use . . . may 
be confined to one person.”54 The secrecy paradigm may have the benefit of clarity, 
but it imposes a harsh bright-line rule where case-by-case precision may be more 
appropriate. 
The secrecy paradigm alone, however, fails to explain the majority of public use 
cases. As applied, public use law is less an indiscriminate blunt axe than a discrimi-
natory scalpel. Sometimes, the Federal Circuit applies its rule that confidentiality 
agreements are just one factor to consider; elsewhere, nondisclosure agreements are 
treated as essential. And sometimes, norms of confidentiality are respected; at other 
times, they are ignored. The result sounds like a confusing muddle, but one distinct 
pattern emerges: corporate inventors tend to win their public use cases; solo entre-
preneurs tend to lose.55  
                                                                                                                 
 
flects the secrecy paradigm. The doctrine states that individuals cannot have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in information in the hands of third parties. It is the subject of great criti-
cism in the legal academy. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and 
Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 752–53 
(2005). But see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 561 (2009). 
 52. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1121. 
 53. 104 U.S. 333 (1881). 
 54. Id. at 335–36. 
 55. This Article uses the hierarchical clustering technique to distinguish between two 
clusters of inventors: (A) those that are supported by large corporate structures, and (B) those 
that invent in their spare time or without corporate resources. Cluster analysis is a method for 
grouping objects together in groups (clusters) based on their similarities across a series of 
variables. See Kenneth D. Bailey, Cluster Analysis, 6 SOC. METHODOLOGY 59, 61 (1975). It is 
a way of drawing boundaries around things that generally behave similarly and, as such, it is 
widely applied in the social sciences, data mining, and even biology. See BRIAN S. EVERITT, 
SABINE LANDAU, MORVEN LEESE & DANIEL STAHL, CLUSTER ANALYSIS 1–13 (5th ed. 2011); 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GENE EXPRESSION MICROARRAY DATA (Terry Speed ed., 2003); 
ANDREW R. WEBB, STATISTICAL PATTERN RECOGNITION 361–62 (2d ed. 2002). For example, a 
sociologist may find that several characteristics (independent variables like age, location, and 
sex) help explain a given behavior (some dependent variable). Male urban youths ages thirteen 
to eighteen tend to behave similarly in one respect, while female suburban youths ages thirteen 
to eighteen behave similar to each other. The two groups can create two or more clusters, 
depending on the method of analysis and research goal. Cluster analysis does not suggest that 
all data points in a given cluster are identical or always behave similarly. Rather, they are 
similar across a closed subset of variables; they may behave differently across a different set 
of independent variables or relative to different dependent variables. There are myriad meth-
ods for determining clusters. Hierarchical clustering is based on the idea that objects are more 
related to objects nearby than objects far away. It employs algorithmic and graphical analysis 
to determine clusters. See B. S. Everitt, Unresolved Problems in Cluster Analysis, 35 
BIOMETRICS 169, 170–77 (1979); Baibing Li, A New Approach to Cluster Analysis: The 
Clustering-Function-Based Method, 68 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 457, 457 (2006). For this 
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Several cases, all of which are summarized in Table I,56 illustrate that argument: 
corporate inventors often do not need nondisclosure agreements; lone entrepreneurs 
do. And corporate norms of confidentiality—among employees and between com-
panies in arm’s length dealing—are usually respected, whereas the more informal, 
but no less powerful confidentiality norms of social friends and other interpersonal 
networks are often ignored. This is another effect of using privacy-as-control in the 
public use context: because it offers no clear guidelines on what happens to infor-
mation after it is no longer a literal secret, it allows judges to privilege certain forms 
of control over others.  
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Article, I plotted, in two-dimensional space, the relationship between inventor identity defined 
by connection to and invention support by an employer and public use result in the cases in 
Figure I. Relative size and strength of employer was based on available corporate revenue data 
from Bloomberg or Hoover.com. Cluster A consists of engineers, programmers, and other 
inventors employed by large corporations who invent devices in course of their employment 
and with the institutional support of their employers. Cluster A includes experts at Xerox, 
biochemists at large pharmaceutical companies, and mechanical engineers at Honeywell, for 
example. Cluster B consists of students, hobbyists, and experts inventing in their spare time. 
The members of these groups were similar to each other on the relevant variables. Three cases 
were eliminated from consideration because, given the facts, clustering would have been ar-
bitrary. Subsequent research could probe whether some small- or medium-sized businesses 
are treated fairly in the public use context. 
 56. The cases analyzed in this Article were chosen from a Westlaw search for reported 
Federal Circuit and district court cases after January 1, 1985 with the following search: “public 
use” & patent. That search resulted in 304 cases. Because a relatively in-depth discussion of 
the public use bar was necessary for analyzing its application, cases where “public use” was 
merely mentioned and not discussed or discussed in passing were eliminated, reducing the 
data set to ninety-seven. A series of cases that seemed to hinge on the public use bar were 
actually “on sale” bar cases. Those were also eliminated from the data set, reducing the number 
to eighty-eight. For the remaining cases, only those cases where it was possible to identify any 
information about the nature of the parties, whether they fell into Cluster A or Cluster B, were 
included. 
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1. The Privileged Position of the Corporate Inventor: Confidentiality Agreements 
Courts tend to give corporate inventors the benefit of the doubt on their public use 
defenses. When the disclosing party is a corporate inventor, rules are generally flexi-
ble, seemingly applied with the goal of protecting the corporation’s patents. Non-
disclosure agreements are rarely required and informal industry norms of confiden-
tiality are often respected. 
Of the twenty-five public use cases included in this analysis, ten involve Cluster 
A (corporate) defendants that won findings of nonpublic use despite disclosures oc-
curring without formal confidentiality agreements.57 At the same time, ten Cluster B 
(solo entrepreneur) defendants faced the opposite result—no confidentiality agree-
ment and a finding of public use.58 But beyond just the results, courts’ perspectives 
on the importance of formal confidentiality agreements also change based on the type 
of public use defendant. For corporate inventors, rules are flexible; for lone entrepre-
neurs, confidentiality agreements are constructively essential. In Dey, L.P. v. 
Sunovion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,59 a case involving two large pharmaceutical com-
panies, the Federal Circuit determined that use of chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease (COPD) medication in clinical trials did not constitute public use even though 
the subjects involved never signed confidentiality agreements.60 The court recog-
nized that clinical trial subjects customarily do not sign confidentiality agreements; 
to require one in this case would ignore the contextual factors that implied a baseline 
of confidentiality regardless of any agreement.61 To reinforce that flexible approach, 
the court even admonished the district court below for its overly formalistic reliance 
on executed agreements.62 And in Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, 
Inc.,63 where one of the largest family-owned furniture companies in the United 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. See Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 778 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 
2015); Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharm., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Am. 
Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. 
Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith 
Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest 
Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa 
USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 26 F. Supp. 
2d 492, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 58. See Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 
2007); JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc., 191 F. App’x. 926, 935 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Eolas Tech. 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. 
Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 
1054, 1058, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1121–22 (Fed. Cir. 
1996); Beachcombers, Int’l v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 
1994); Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., No. 93-1421, 1994 WL 18963, *2–3 
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1994); In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Mass. Inst. 
of Tech. v. Harman Int’l Indus., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 297, 313 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 59. 715 F.3d 1351. 
 60. Id. at 1354. 
 61. Id. at 1357–58. 
 62. Id. at 1357. 
 63. 386 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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States displayed patented material at an industry trade show that did not require 
signed confidentiality agreements,64 the court noted that a formal secrecy agreement 
“is one factor to be considered” and immediately reframed the analysis as a totality 
of the circumstances test for inventor control in context.65  
But courts are rarely so charitable and flexible in cases involving Cluster B (solo 
entrepreneur) defendants. In Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Laboratories, Inc.,66 
for example, the Federal Circuit found that the use of a centrifuge by a National 
Institutes of Health researcher in his personal laboratory constituted disqualifying 
public use because he maintained no control over the device.67 The most important 
factor leaning against control seemed to be the fact that the inventor demonstrated 
the technology to colleagues without a confidentiality agreement or any indication 
that it should be kept secret.68 In Lough v. Brunswick Corp.,69 a corrosion-proof seal 
for stern drives was tested on boats belonging to several of the inventor’s friends and 
colleagues.70 The court determined that the use was public because the inventor 
lacked any control over the seals: he asked for no follow up, did not supervise their 
use, and never asked his friends to sign confidentiality agreements.71 And in 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Harman International Industries, Inc.,72 in-
ventors used their friends to test a car navigation system, but never required confi-
dentiality agreements from them or corporate sponsors.73 In each of these cases, the 
lack of a confidentiality agreement between the parties, though ostensibly only one 
of many factors to consider, was always among the most important. 
The narrative in Beachcombers, International, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative 
Products, Inc.74 makes the point even more clear. In that case, the designer and de-
veloper of an improved kaleidoscope wanted to solicit feedback on the design from 
her friends and colleagues.75 She invited twenty to thirty of them to a private party at 
her home for a demonstration and, without asking them to sign a confidentiality 
agreement, allowed her guests to handle the invention.76 The situation had all the 
indicia of a controlled social event: an invite-only guest list consisting of friends and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. Id. at 1374. 
 65. Id. at 1379–80 (quoting Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 
(Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 66. 88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
 67. Id. at 1059.  
 68. Id. at 1058–59 (reasoning that the inventor’s “lack of effort to maintain the centrifuge 
as confidential coupled with the free flow into his laboratory of people, including visitors to 
NIH, who observed the centrifuge in operation and who were under no duty of confidentiality” 
necessitated a finding of “public use.”). 
 69. 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
 70. Id. at 1116. 
 71. Id. at 1120–21. “The last factor of control is critically important . . . .” Id. at 1120. 
 72. 584 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 73. Id. at 303–04. 
 74. 31 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 75. Id. at 1156, 1159.  
 76. Id. at 1159–60 (noting that the inventor “personally demonstrated the device to some 
of the guests for the purpose of getting feedback on the device; . . . she made no efforts to 
conceal the device or keep anything about it secret”); Brief for Defendant-Appellee, 
WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc. at 11, Beachcombers, 31 F.3d 1154 (No. 93-1258). 
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colleagues who were invited for the purposes of testing, experimentation, and feed-
back. The only thing missing was a formal secrecy agreement. Without it, though, 
the use was considered sufficiently public for two reasons: first, the kaleidoscope 
was out of the developer’s control during the party; second, she placed no restrictions 
on guests sharing what they learned. 
The correlation may not be perfect: there are several examples listed in Table I 
where Cluster A defendants lose their public use cases in part because they failed to 
secure confidentiality agreements. But, in this case, the exceptions help prove the 
rule. Like those involving Cluster B defendants above, the opinions in these cases 
elevate formal secrecy agreements to almost determinative status. In Pronova 
BioPharma Norge AS v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,77 for example, where a 
pharmaceutical company sent drug samples to an outside doctor for testing,78 the 
court’s holding highlighted the central importance of a confidentiality agreement, 
concluding the public use happened when samples were sent “with no confidentiality 
restrictions.”79 Pronova and cases like Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. 
Appleton Papers Inc.,80 Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc.,81 and New Railhead 
Manufacturing, L.L.C. v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co.82 may not rest exclusively on 
the lack of formal confidentiality agreements. But the pattern is unmistakable: a non-
disclosure contract is, in practice, more important than the black letter law would 
suggest.83  
This is a boon to corporate inventors even when they lose. Although simple non-
disclosure agreements are freely available online,84 solo entrepreneurs, part-time de-
velopers, and hobbyists lack the power and leverage to insist on confidentiality 
agreements from their business partners. Nor do they have the money to pay attor-
neys to draft professional ones. As courts and scholars have noted in the corporate 
and labor contexts, small businesses lack the bargaining power of large, entrenched 
interests.85 During its onboarding process for new hires, for example, Apple devotes 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. 549 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 78. Id. at 942. 
 79. Id. at 939. 
 80. 35 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (D. Minn. 1999) (“No 3M employee was asked to sign a 
secrecy agreement before using them. And 3M announced no special company-wide policy 
regarding [the invention’s] use or circulation.”). 
 81. 96 F.3d 1423, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Moreover, there was no evidence that Quaker 
had entered into any secrecy agreement with Sohio . . . .”). 
 82. 298 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (no confidentiality agreement). 
 83. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(stating that a formal confidentiality agreement is supposed to be just one of many non-
determinative factors). 
 84. A Google search for “free nondisclosure agreement sample” retrieved 1.8 million hits 
in less than half a second. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (search: free nondisclosure 
agreement sample). 
 85. See Kenneth M. Casebeer, Supreme Court Without a Clue: 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett and the System of Collective Action and Collective Bargaining Established by the 
National Labor Relations Act, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1066–67, 1067 n.18 (2011) (dis-
cussing unequal bargaining power between corporations and individuals); see also Postal 
Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (noting 
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an entire week to confidentiality and requires employees sign several long, overlap-
ping nondisclosure agreements and agree to abide by the company’s well-known 
lock-down and secrecy practices.86 A start-up would have difficulty attracting nec-
essary talent if it copied Apple’s practice. 
2. The Privileged Position of the Corporate Inventor: Norms of Confidentiality 
Corporate privilege in public use law extends beyond a more flexible approach to 
formal confidentiality agreements. Indeed, the reason why so many Cluster A de-
fendants that fail to secure secrecy commitments win their public use cases is because 
courts are willing to fill the gap left by a contract with industry norms and customs 
of confidentiality. They almost never do the same for Cluster B (solo entrepreneur) 
inventors. The unequal application is two steps back from what would have other-
wise been a step forward toward a flexible, social network–oriented approach to pub-
lic use. 
A comparison of two cases—Bernhardt and Beachcombers—puts this corporate 
privilege in relief. Neither case featured signed confidentiality agreements, yet 
Bernhardt won its case, whereas the inventor in Beachcombers lost. Bernhardt owned 
several design patents for furniture,87 all of which were displayed in their entirety at 
an exhibition for industry in advance of a large annual trade show. The exhibition 
was by invitation only, and entry required identification at several points. Bernhardt 
representatives were also available to escort attendees around and answer ques-
tions.88 Attendees included sixty-nine of Bernhardt’s customers and newspaper re-
porters from Furniture Today.89 For the Federal Circuit, the lack of confidentiality 
agreements, the arguable commercial motive for inviting customers, and the presence 
of reporters did not make Bernhardt’s disclosure of its designs public. Rather, the 
entirety of the social context of disclosure suggested that norms of confidentiality 
were in place. The court’s conclusion is worth quoting in full: 
While it is clear that [exhibition] attendees were not required to sign con-
fidentiality agreements, . . . in the circumstances of this case, confidenti-
ality agreements were unnecessary. At trial, Bernhardt presented the tes-
timony . . . that although no confidentiality agreement was provided to 
Pre-Market attendees, “[i]t’s pretty well understood that confidentiality 
applies to premarket [sic].” . . .  Pre-Market attendees have an incentive 
not to divulge Bernhardt’s designs, because they would not be able to 
participate if they divulged the Pre-Market designs. . . . Pre-Market was 
                                                                                                                 
 
inequality of bargaining power between small businesses and large corporations and acknowl-
edging that “[b]efore the [franchise] relationship is established, abuse is threatened by the 
franchisor’s use of contracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis”) (quoting 
E.S. Bills, Inc. v. Tzucanow, 700 P.2d 1280, 1288 (Cal. 1985) (Mosk, J., concurring)). 
 86. See, e.g., Jay Yarow, What It’s Like on Day One as an Apple Employee, BUS. INSIDER 
(Jan. 26, 2012 11:39 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-its-like-on-day-one-as-an-
apple-employee-2012-1 [https://perma.cc/58PJ-JTUB].  
 87. Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 88. Id. at 1374. 
 89. Id. at 1379. 
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not open to the public, that the identification of attendees was checked 
against a list of authorized names both by building security and later at a 
reception desk near the showroom, that attendees were escorted through 
the showroom, and that attendees were not permitted to make written 
notes or take photographs inside the showroom.90  
The evidence of industry confidentiality norms and expectations—that it is “pretty 
well understood that confidentiality applies to” the exhibition—came from 
Bernhardt’s general manager.91 The court did what it should: look at the entirety of 
the social context of a given disclosure and respect the norms of confidentiality ema-
nating from that context. 
The Federal Circuit changes its tune when the inventor is a solo entrepreneur. In 
Beachcombers, for example, the designer of a new kaleidoscope disclosed her design 
in a context at least comparable, if not more private, to the exhibition in Bernhardt. 
She hosted twenty to thirty friends and colleagues at an invite-only cocktail gathering 
at her home, demonstrated the kaleidoscope and its unique characteristics, and asked 
for feedback. No members of the press were present. Nor were customers invited; 
the inventor had no customers.92 Despite the contextual evidence of implied confi-
dentiality and privacy—an invite-only social gathering at a private home with testi-
mony from the inventor that the purpose of the event was to gain feedback—the court 
concluded that the demonstrations constituted invalidating public use based on testi-
mony from one of the guests, contradicted by the inventor, that confidentiality was 
not implied.93 In other words, the court was comfortable with ignoring social norms 
and elevating the importance of a confidentiality agreement when the inventor was 
creating in her spare time. 
If the disparate treatment of corporate and solo inventors is insufficiently clear 
from Bernhardt and Beachcombers, the contrast between Xerox Corp. v. 3Com 
Corp.94 and National Research Development Corp. v. Varian Associates95 is even 
starker. In Xerox, a Cluster A case, a company employee developed, in the course of 
his employment, a technique for more efficient computer recognition of 
handwriting.96 The alleged invalidating public use was the inventor’s submission of 
a videotape of himself demonstrating the invention to chairpersons of an industry 
conference at which he wanted to present. No confidentiality agreement accompa-
nied the videotape.97 But the court said this was not public use because industry 
norms said otherwise: “[a]s a matter of formal policy and procedure as well as pro-
fessional courtesy and practice, [the conference] review committees treat every sub-
mission confidentially.”98 There may have been no binding secrecy agreement, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. Id. at 1381 ([sic] in original) (citations omitted). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Beachcombers Int’l v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). 
 93. Id. at 1160. 
 94. 26 F. Supp. 2d 492 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 95. No. 93-1421, 1994 WL 18963 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1994). 
 96. Xerox, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 492–93. 
 97. Id. at 493–94. 
 98. Id. at 496 (first alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). 
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court noted, but conference organizers were “under a professional ethical obligation” 
to maintain confidentiality.99  
Such norms were ignored in National Research Development Corp. That case in-
volved a graduate student who invented a method for improving nuclear magnetic 
resonance sample analysis,100 the “essence” of which was disclosed by the student’s 
adviser to a long-standing friend at a scientific conference.101 Admittedly, there may 
be a difference between disclosure to a conference organizer and an attendee, but the 
court in National Research Development Corp. emphasized the lack of a confidenti-
ality agreement and the conference goal of encouraging open dialogue rather than 
the norms of confidentiality inherent in friendship and at academic conferences.102 
The former set of considerations went unmentioned in Xerox, highlighting both the 
contrasting result and perspectives and language that appear to differ based on the 
category of the inventor. 
C. Implications of Uneven Application of the Public Use Bar 
That courts tend to treat corporate inventors and solo entrepreneurs differently is 
itself a concern. Our laws, in general, and intellectual property laws, in particular, 
should be applied dispassionately, evenly, and absent discrimination. There are three 
additional implications of public use law’s privileged treatment of corporate inven-
tors, two of which are practical and one is theoretical. After discussing these impli-
cations, the balance of this Article proposes a solution that responds to all three 
concerns. 
First, the unequal treatment makes patent defense harder and more expensive, di-
rectly increasing barriers to entry into the innovation economy for a wide swath of 
the inventing class. Obtaining a patent is already an expensive ordeal.103 Additional 
costs from the likelihood of future (unsuccessful) litigation104 further discourages 
entrepreneurs. Litigation increases costs and decreases the net present value of a 
patent, and uncertainty in litigation outcome, evidenced by courts’ uneven and 
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sometimes haphazard application of public use, increases costs significantly.105 That 
they are more likely to fail to protect their patents may also discourage entrepreneurs 
from entering the patent process, opting, in some cases, for trade secrecy106 or 
declining to innovate in the first place.  
Second, the pattern of favoring corporate inventors entrenches an already unequal 
and strikingly homogenous patent landscape. According to the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO), nearly all of the top 100 patentees in 2014 were large corporations,107 
which, although not itself evidence of inequality—large corporations with many em-
ployees likely have more inventions—feeds a larger narrative of entrenched privi-
lege. For example, women remain a distinct minority among science and technology 
graduates108 employed in inventor roles at large corporations.109 If male-dominated 
corporations continue to control the patent world, the contributions of women and 
other minorities could still be minimized.110 A recent study of 4.6 million utility pa-
tents granted by the PTO between 1976 and 2013 found that “[w]omen contributed 
less than 8% of all inventorships for the entire period,” maxing out at 10.8% in 2013, 
an increase from 2.7% in 1976.111 Men dominate patenting in almost every country, 
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with forty-two countries listing no female inventors whatsoever.112 Among academic 
life science patentees, women patent at about 40% the rate of men.113 And gender 
inequality in the patent world does not stop there: historically, women were not only 
discouraged from claiming credit for their inventions; their innovations were actively 
co-opted by husbands, fathers, brothers, and other men around them.114 As Dan Burk 
has suggested, the continued underrepresentation of women among patentees and 
patent examiners may suggest that the “system retains some residue” of more overt 
historical discrimination.115 Any part of that system that privileges corporate 
inventors to the exclusion of a more diverse innovator pool may contribute to that 
residual imbalance. 
Underlying these practical problems is a broader doctrinal failure. At its heart, the 
public use bar is about disclosure, a transfer of information from one person to an-
other. As such, it is a distinctly social phenomenon that is fact specific and highly 
contextual.116 And yet the principles of privacy-as-control, which, as discussed 
above,117 locate analysis within the disclosing party rather than in the social context 
of disclosure, dominate the doctrine. Judges tend to focus on the inventor’s volitional 
acts and secondarily, if at all, consider the context in which those acts occurred. Only 
rarely are social norms respected like they are in Bernhardt, and when they are, cor-
porate inventors are usually the beneficiaries.  
In cases like Bernhardt, Dey, and American Seating, the Federal Circuit acknowl-
edged that the relationship between the inventor and those to whom she discloses her 
invention should matter because certain relationships could give rise to an expecta-
tion of confidentiality. In Bernhardt, the court accepted that participants in the pre-
market furniture show could have a custom of confidentiality based on their status as 
industry partners.118 In Dey, the court recognized that patients in clinical trials typi-
cally do not sign confidentiality agreements, so, given that custom, none should be 
required in this case.119 And in American Seating, the Federal Circuit affirmed that 
even without confidentiality agreements, the disclosure to a business partner who 
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helped build the invention and the internal demonstration to the inventor’s employees 
were both done in contexts of implied confidentiality.120 
But those relationships are ignored in Cluster B (solo entrepreneur) cases. If any-
thing, the relationships between the parties in Beachcombers (friends and col-
leagues), Lough (friends and colleagues), and MIT (friends) were closer than the re-
lationships in Bernhardt (participants in the same business), Dey (clinical trial 
designers and subjects), and American Seating (business partners and employees), 
and yet all three of the former lost their public use cases. Elsewhere, district courts, 
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court have gone out of their way to disclaim 
any relevance of the relationship between the parties for determining confidentiality 
or control.121 However, disclosures of all kinds happen in context—one that, I argue, 
is characterized by trust. 
II. TRUST AND SOCIAL NETWORK CONFIDENTIALITY 
To address these doctrinal and practical deficiencies, this Article proposes a re-
orientation of public use law around three principles: that it should (1) apply equally 
and evenly to corporate and entrepreneurial inventors alike; (2) retain fidelity to the 
goals of patent law, in general, and the public use bar, in particular; and (3) reflect 
the social context of disclosure.122 Though hardly controversial, these elements have 
been missing from the doctrine and its application: the law adheres to the individual-
focused conception of privacy-as-control, privileges corporate inventors over solo 
entrepreneurs, and perversely discourages patenting among some innovators.  
The public use bar is a limitation on disclosure. Social scientists have shown that 
there are several factors at play in the disclosure of information to small groups: 
norms of trust, the structure of the network in which the information is disclosed, the 
nature of the information itself, and the relationship between the disclosing party and 
the members of her network.123 Together, these factors help explain why individuals 
disclose private information to others and determine the circumstances in which in-
formation disclosed to a small group will escape to a larger one. We can apply these 
factors to achieve our goal of fair public use jurisprudence. I argue that different 
networks can develop powerful norms of confidentiality and discretion—commonly 
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understood as trust—on which individuals (and inventors) should be able to rely. 
When disclosures happen in these contexts of trust, they are not public and should 
be protected as such.  
In this section, I summarize the basic principles of social network theory and what 
I have called privacy-as-trust; capture the lessons of that literature for disclosure and 
public use contexts; translate those lessons into a flexible, network-based, and ad-
ministrable tool for public use cases; and show how elements of this proposal will 
not only advance the policy goals of patent law, but are also readily reflected across 
intellectual property regimes. 
A. A Theory of Trust and Information Flow 
Social network theory gets us part of the way to our goal. It helps explain how 
and why certain information may flow through a network and into another, wider 
network, and why other types of disclosure may not. But it does not explain why we 
share in the first place. This is the role of trust—specifically, what sociologists call 
“particular social trust.” Together, trust and social network theory provide a step-by-
step model that assesses the reasonableness of disclosures and the likelihood of sub-
sequent publicity. They are perfect tools for public use law reform. 
1. Social Networks and Information Diffusion 
Social network theory is the cross-disciplinary study of how the structure of net-
works affects behavior.124 A network is just a set of objects125—people, cells, power 
plants—with connections among them—social encounters, synapses, grids. They are 
all around us: a family is a (social) network, as is the (neural) network in a brain and 
the (distribution) network of trash pick-up routes in New York City. To see one visu-
alization of diffusion through a network,126 dab the nib of a marker into the middle 
of a piece of construction paper and you will see, in real time, the diffusion of ink 
from one origin point, or node, through the lattice-like network of fibers that make 
up the paper. Facebook is the paradigmatic modern social network: its overarching 
network has billions of nodes (members),127 but it also has billions of subnetworks, 
where nodes overlap, interact, and share information. It is a network’s ability to in-
vite, disseminate, and retain information that concerns us. 
As Lior Strahilevitz has shown, the theory of information flow within and among 
networks can begin the discussion of when information disclosed to a small group is 
still private.128 It helps establish two important conclusions: that both the structure of 
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a network and the nature of information disclosed into it affect the flow of infor-
mation through and beyond it. 
Although networks are evolving ecosystems129—people constantly drop in and 
out—human social networks tend to be close knit and highly “clustered,”130 with 
“strong ties” linking us to our friends.131 Family members are good examples of in-
dividuals with strong ties: everyone knows everyone else and each member engages 
in repeated social interactions with each other. They spend a lot of time together, 
have deep emotional connections, and reciprocate the connection with each other.132 
Members of other tightly clustered networks—support groups, recreational sports 
teams, individuals with the same political beliefs—share with each other. Social net-
work theory does not tell us precisely why these persons feel comfortable sharing 
personal information with each other, but it does explain one form of information 
diffusion: the stronger the tie between two individuals, the more likely their friends 
overlap, and the more likely information will stay within those close-knit overlapping 
networks. For example, Michelle tells her best friend Nicole about her idea for a new 
mobile app, hoping Nicole will give her some advice. Nicole may tell Opher, her 
husband and Michelle’s childhood friend. In this network, Michelle’s mobile app 
idea is unlikely to spread. If networks only had strong ties, we would see many 
groups of friends that recycle information among themselves.133 Based on this re-
search, we can conclude that disclosures among close-knit strong ties will rarely dif-
fuse to the wider public. 
Information is spread between different clusters through what Mark Granovetter 
has called “weak ties.”134 Some weak ties are “supernodes,” or society’s socialites:135 
they have friends in different groups and make connections among them. One exam-
ple might be an in-law. My sister is part of my close-knit family network; her hus-
band is part of his. If he is indeed close to his family and a social person, he could 
perform the function of a network bridge, making connections between our two very 
different families.  
More often than not, though, people are linked by the acquaintances they share 
—two strangers on a train marveling that they have the same mutual friend.136 These 
weak-tie bridges, Professor Granovetter has shown, are the driving force behind 
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information dissemination from one close-knit group to another.137 These weak ties 
are acquaintances we don’t know well, but with whom interactions are essential if 
we want to bring outside information into a close-knit group full of strong ties.138 
Consider another example: Jennifer is a doctor, a soccer mom, and a hiker; she is 
friends with her work colleagues, casually acquainted with her child’s teammates’ 
moms and dads, and close with her hiking buddies, with whom she goes on an annual 
trip to Machu Pichu. An occasionally random conversation at work or at a soccer 
game about hiking may introduce a love for the outdoors to a soccer dad who has 
lived all his life in Manhattan. Professor Granovetter has shown that these types of 
weak ties are essential to, among other things, getting jobs:139 weak ties bring in 
contacts and information you would not otherwise have received.140 When there are 
no weak ties between individuals otherwise connected by only a few steps, or when 
those ties are inactive, those even nearby nodes are highly unlikely to ever encounter 
each other or the information they disseminate. They have what Ronald Burt has 
called a “structural hole” between them.141 As the active bridges between close-knit 
groups, then, weak ties are essential for information diffusion. 
But the structure of the network—clustering, distance between clusters, and types 
of connections, as well as any exogenous limitations to the network—is not the only 
important element. The nature of the information also matters. Weak ties are not 
adept at transmitting all types of information. Job openings or rumors are easy to 
pass along: they are simple pieces of information that do not degrade along the line 
and are, therefore, amenable to transmission during short chance encounters with 
acquaintances.142 But studies have shown that they are ill equipped to transfer com-
plex information or aggregate pieces of information into a richer picture.143 In other 
words, weak ties cannot put two and two together to make four; conversations with 
acquaintances rarely involve in-depth analysis. Put another way, anyone who has 
ever played the game Telephone as a child remembers that simple statements make 
it through, but complex ones get mangled.  
Professor Strahilevitz illustrated these points using the popular parlor game, “Six 
Degrees of Kevin Bacon.”144 Duncan Watts used stories from his own life.145 
Facebook is another helpful, accessible model. Facebook is an evolving ecosystem, 
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where new people are always joining and dropping out, changing our own social 
networks. The average adult Facebook user has 338 friends146 but “follows” far 
fewer, with fewer still showing up on her news feeds.147 This subnetwork of friends 
tends to be close knit, constituted by many overlapping strong ties. But Facebook’s 
algorithm, while privileging close friends, allows posts from acquaintances in our 
networks to appear on our feeds, as well. These weak ties bring in additional infor-
mation from outside our closest-knit groups. The type of information also matters: 
studies show that status updates, shared links, and photos reach more members of 
your network than friendships and wall posts.148 
2. Trust and Sharing 
But social network theory does not explain why we share information with 
others—strong or weak ties, intimate friends or strangers—in the first place. As an 
information flow model, it skips the first step: social network models help explain 
how the ink spreads through the construction paper, not why we placed the marker 
nib on the paper. But this is essential for developing an administrable model for ad-
judicating public use cases: the initial disclosure to others has to be reasonable, not 
reckless, and one that society, and by extension, the law is willing to protect.149 This 
is the role of trust.150 
What sociologists call particular social trust is a resource of social capital between 
or among two or more persons concerning the expectations that other members of 
their community will behave according to accepted norms.151 It is the “favorable ex-
pectation regarding other people’s actions and intentions,”152 or the belief that others 
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will behave in a predictable manner. As such, it deals in expectations and percep-
tions. For example, if I ask a friend to hold my spare set of keys, I trust she will not 
break in and steal from me. When an individual speaks with relative strangers in a 
support group like Alcoholics Anonymous, she trusts that they will not divulge her 
secrets. I cannot know for certain that my neighbor will not abuse her key privileges 
or that my fellow support group members will keep my confidences, so trust allows 
me to interact with and rely on them. If I never trusted, my social life would be para-
lyzed. As Niklas Luhmann stated, trust exists where knowledge ends.153 It is the mu-
tual “faithfulness” on which all social interaction depends.154 And I earn all sorts of 
positive rewards as a result.155  
Trust is at the core of individuals’ decisions to share personal information with 
others.156 From support groups157 to social friends and even websites,158 trust is the 
linchpin that gives individuals the comfort and confidence to share. Trust can arise 
from explicit or implicit social cues: One may preface a conversation by stating, 
“This is to be kept between us.” Or, two people sharing a secret at a party might 
physically turn their bodies away from the crowd, huddle down, and whisper.159 Trust 
can also be based on experience—expectations developed over a history of sharing 
—and confidentiality.160 Trust and a willingness to disclose may also emanate 
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recommendations of others. See TALCOTT PARSONS, ACTION THEORY AND THE HUMAN 
CONDITION 45–47 (1978). Plus, it encourages therapeutic sharing by giving all individuals, 
from alcoholics and those suffering from depression to close friends, the confidence they need 
to disclose personal and perhaps stigmatizing information. See, e.g., AARON T. BECK & BRAD 
A. ALFORD, DEPRESSION: CAUSES AND TREATMENT 292–324 (2d. ed. 2009). For a more in-
depth discussion of the social benefits of particular social trust, see Waldman, supra note 5, at 
601–05. 
 156. See Waldman, supra note 16 (providing empirical evidence based on a study of 
Facebook users that trust is essential in individuals’ decision to share personal information 
online). 
 157. See, e.g., Gene A. Shelley, H. Russell Bernard, Peter Killworth, Eugene Johnsen & 
Christopher McCarty, Who Knows Your HIV Status? What HIV + Patients and Their Network 
Members Know About Each Other, 17 SOC. NETWORKS 189, 204 (1995). 
 158. Timothy Morey, Theodore “Theo” Forbath & Allison Schoop, Customer Data: 
Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2015, at 97, https://hbr.org 
/2015/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust [https://perma.cc/7T8L-S8PX]. 
 159. These implicit cues of confidentiality are discussed at length in ERVING GOFFMAN, 
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 112–32 (1959) (discussing the “backstage” of 
social interaction). See also ERVING GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION (1969). 
 160. See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 98–99 (1964); John 
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directly from social network norms and the identities of the network’s members. 
Gene Shelley’s study of sharing one’s HIV status with others is a good illustration. 
HIV status is, for many, private but not secret: many of the same people that choose 
to hide their status from acquaintances, friends, and even family for fear of ostracism, 
stigmatization, homophobia, or worse,161 are willing to share it with relative strangers 
who are also living with HIV.162 Several participants in Shelley’s ethnographic study 
explained why. For example, one stated: “I would tell my support group. Everyone 
there is HIV-positive and I’m comfortable there.”163 Another stated: “The only two 
people, aside from members of my support group and doctors, who know are my 
former lover (who gave her the HIV) and my son’s father.”164  
Neither the structure of the participants’ networks nor the nature of the infor-
mation explains why individuals share private information in the first place. It cannot 
be the mere fact that a support group is close knit; so is a family, and many re-
spondents adamantly refuse to disclose their status to family members. Individuals 
on Facebook share information with different subnetworks of friends, as well, many 
of which look like the close-knit networks discussed above.165 The explanation for 
why we share, therefore, has to account for differences among networks. A better 
explanation is a form of network-specific trust: with respect to preventing the further 
spread of a person’s HIV status, individuals living with HIV can better predict the 
future behavior of others also living with HIV (even if they know very little else 
about them) than others with whom they may be close for different reasons. This 
unstated implication of Shelley’s research suggests that powerful norms of confiden-
tiality and behavior that limit information flow can develop within different social 
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networks depending on structure, the nature of the information, and indicia of trust 
among members. 
3. Takeaways  
If we combine the lessons of privacy-as-trust with social network theory, one 
overarching conclusion emerges: information disclosed in networks characterized by 
trust is not truly public because that information was shared with the legitimate ex-
pectation that information recipients would be discrete. Relying upon expectations 
of network members’ continued adherence to accepted social norms, individuals 
share sensitive information with their network. If it is a network of almost exclusively 
strong ties, as many informal social networks are, the information is likely to be kept 
confidential. The presence of weak ties increases the likelihood of information dif-
fusion outside the network. And what constitutes a strong or a weak tie may vary 
with the information at issue, as will the ease of diffusion: complicated information 
generally does not travel through weak ties, but what is simple to one audience may 
be complex to another. The greater the audience’s applicable skill level relative to 
the information, the more likely it falls on the simpler end of the information 
spectrum. 
We can apply these lessons to developing a model for analyzing public use cases. 
First, the test for public use must be a totality of the circumstances test, as correctly 
stated in Bernhardt. This kind of flexible standard is the only way to assess a social 
context on a case-by-case basis. Second, the test should focus on (1) the information 
disclosed, (2) the network into which inventions are disclosed, looking for weak ties 
likely to spread the information and strong ties that do not, and assessing relative 
complexity of the information, and (3) the relationship between the parties, looking 
for indicia of trust. Third, some of the questions fact finders should ask include, but 
may not be limited to, the following: Did the relationship between the inventor and 
her audience show any evidence of implied confidentiality and trust? Was the 
demonstration or use of the invention done in such a way so as to reveal to the audi-
ence how it worked? Was the invention complex, especially relative to the skill level 
of the audience? Did the audience contain anyone not bound by trust? And, did the 
audience contain “supernodes” that could bridge networks?  
These questions can help fact finders establish the expectations of all parties in-
volved in an alleged public use. Notably, these questions do not prevent a court from 
considering other factors, including the presence of confidentiality agreements and 
evidence of commercial motive for the use. The new standard merely ensures that 
neither formal agreements nor commercial intent is elevated to determinative status 
and that the locus of analysis shifts from the individual to the social context of 
disclosure. 
B. Advantages to the Approach: Social Networks and Intellectual Property 
Applying privacy-as-trust to public use questions fills the gap left by the current 
privacy-as-control approach: it is egalitarian, flexible, practical, and retains fidelity 
to the policy objectives of patent law. Nor is it a radical proposal: the respect for 
social network theory embedded in privacy-as-trust already cuts across all 
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intellectual property regimes. This Article’s flexible, network-oriented approach to 
public use will, therefore, fit neatly within our intellectual property legal traditions. 
Privacy-as-trust will end the current system’s uneven and unfair application. As 
discussed above, the current application of public use law privileges corporate in-
ventors over solo entrepreneurs166 in two ways: respecting industry norms of confi-
dentiality while ignoring the more informal social norms of friends,167 and elevating 
the importance of formal confidentiality agreements to near determinative status.168 
The first tendency directly benefits the already entrenched interests of corporate 
patentees; the second tendency indirectly enhances their position because only 
wealthy inventors have the leverage to insist on nondisclosure agreements and the 
money to pay lawyers to write them. These discriminatory applications are an 
outgrowth of employing a privacy-as-control standard: it lends itself to bright-line 
rules regarding disclosure and ignores the social context in which an inventor decides 
to demonstrate her invention.169  
Privacy-as-trust gives judges the tools to reverse these tendencies. It does not dis-
criminate between social networks; indeed, the proposal is built around the notion 
that different social networks can create equally powerful norms of confidentiality 
and low likelihoods of information diffusion beyond the network. And by shifting 
the public use analysis from the inventor’s actions to the social context of disclosure, 
it ensures that myriad factors beyond signed confidentiality agreements will be in 
play. In turn, inventors and entrepreneurs traditionally underrepresented in the cor-
porate world will be given a fair shot. 
It also remains true to the goals of patent law, in general, and the public use bar, 
in particular. As expressed by the Federal Circuit outlined in Tone Bros. v. Sysco 
Corp.,170 those goals are 
(1) discouraging the removal, from the public domain, of inventions that 
the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available; (2) favor-
ing the prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions; (3) allowing the 
inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity to deter-
mine the potential economic value of a patent; and (4) prohibiting the 
inventor from commercially exploiting the invention for a period greater 
than the statutorily prescribed time.171 
Inventions disclosed to close friends or colleagues whom we trust cannot truly be 
said to be “freely available” in any sense. It is no different than trusting thousands of 
employees or several corporate partners not to talk about a new device. Prompt dis-
closure and patenting is still incentivized by the America Invents Act’s switch from 
a first-to-invent rule, which could delay application as long the inventor had evidence 
of when she first created her device, to a first-to-file rule. And there is less likely to 
be evidence of commercial exploitation or sales activity in situations of disclosures 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. See supra Part I.B. 
 167. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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to social friends and other trusted social networks. Indeed, looking to relationships 
of trust may advance the goals of the patent system: it would encourage more exper-
imentation among corporate inventors and lone entrepreneurs alike. As the Supreme 
Court said in 1877, it does not frustrate the public interest when delays in patenting 
are “occasioned by a bona fide effort to bring [the] invention to perfection, or to 
ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended.”172 The patent monopoly is, 
after all, only temporary, “and it is the interest of the public, as well as [the inven-
tor’s], that the invention should be perfect and properly tested, before a patent is 
granted for it.”173 A respect for relationships of trust among inventors and their 
friends and colleagues would not only help realize this goal, but it would also chal-
lenge the results in cases like Beachcombers, Lough, and MIT. 
Beyond these policy benefits, the network-oriented approach of privacy-as-trust 
occupies an underappreciated yet salient position across intellectual property law, 
making it even more reasonable to apply it to public use cases. Social network theory 
permeates all branches of intellectual property. In particular, the requirements for 
obtaining copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret protection all incorporate the 
principles of social network theory.  
Copyright’s originality threshold,174 for example, which requires a bare modicum 
of creativity to obtain a copyright,175 is defined relative to the industry norms in 
which the creator belongs. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services 
Co.,176 for example, the seminal Supreme Court case on copyright originality, a run-
of-the-mill phonebook was not copyrightable because it was designed, arranged, and 
presented in an ordinary manner. But “ordinary” was defined relative to the closed 
network of other phone books. Rural’s local phone book was “typical,”177 unlike 
Feist’s, which covered a wider area and included additional data.178 In the end, the 
reason why Rural’s local phonebook was not copyrightable was because it was just 
like every other phonebook: “Rural’s white pages are entirely typical. . . . The end 
product is a garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the slightest trace 
of creativity.”179 Typicality is, by definition, entirely contextual and based on the 
customs and norms of a particular field, that is, something is typical compared to 
something else. It is typical for phone books to be alphabetical. It is not typical for, 
say, epic poems to be alphabetical listings of words.180 
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Like copyright’s originality threshold, patent law’s substantive requirements of 
patentability take a network-oriented approach. Inventions that are obvious to a  “per-
son having ordinary skill in the art,” or PHOSITA,181 are unpatentable.182 Patent ap-
plications that cannot teach the PHOSITA how to make or use the invention are also 
invalid.183 
Differences among social networks are also embedded in trademark law. The 
Lanham Act protects marks relative to particular goods in commerce: Bass 
Brewery’s trademark on the word “Bass,” for example, protects its use of “Bass” for 
beer. It does not give the company ownership over the word “bass” in all contexts.184 
Among the several factors courts use to assess consumer confusion and, thus, 
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act,185 three take a network-specific ap-
proach: the more related the products and the more overlap in marketing channels, 
the greater the likelihood of a confusion finding, presuming that products that target 
different networks are less likely to be confused with each other. Courts also assess 
the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers, implicitly recognizing that 
different consumers behave differently. Consumer confusion, therefore, is an infor-
mation flow problem, but one that reflects how information diffuses from one net-
work to another.186 
Trade secret law goes even further than recognizing that social networks exist. In 
fact, without ever using the language of social network theory and trust, trade secrecy 
employs the network-oriented, trust-based model described above in three ways. 
First, a trade secret is defined relative to a given network. Although the rule is that 
information “generally known or readily ascertainable” to the public cannot consti-
tute a trade secret, the “public,” in this case, refers to a given industry.187 The rule 
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makes sense as a matter of economics and competition, but it also reflects the social 
science of information diffusion. An oil company executive might come across the 
proprietary recipe of a donut company,188 but unless there are weak ties ready to 
disseminate the recipe beyond the oil industry and, somehow, to the confections busi-
ness, the information is unlikely to get to those who could use it.189 
A second lesson of social network theory—that weak ties between networks are 
ill equipped to disseminate complex or aggregated information190—is also reflected 
in the law of trade secrets. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Metallurgical Industries, Inc. 
v. Fourtek, Inc.,191 a seminal and oft-cited trade secrets case, the aggregation of 
pieces of information, “each of which, by itself, is in the public domain,” can be a 
trade secret because knowledge and aggregation of those bits of data could provide 
a competitive advantage.192 Again, the economic rationale makes sense. But implicit 
in this aggregation rule is the assumption that industry competitors are not adept at 
piecing together bits of distant data points or, to use the language of social network 
theory, that complex and aggregated information does not diffuse through networks 
easily and is unlikely to be gathered up, analyzed, and put to use through weak ties. 
Otherwise, the aggregate information could not be considered a secret in any sense.  
Third, when it comes to the prior disclosure of confidential business information, 
a problem similar to prepatenting use, trade secret law takes a network- and 
relationship-oriented approach, unconsciously implementing some of the lessons of 
social network theory and trust. As Sharon Sandeen showed in her cross-disciplinary 
study of privacy and trade secrecy,193 trade secret law embraces the doctrine of “rela-
tive secrecy.”194 This is the notion that legal protection for trade secrets can be re-
tained even when others know the secret. The test for determining when such protec-
tion exists “is contextual and depends on a number of factors, not the least of which 
is the relationship . . . between the trade secret owner and the person(s) to whom the 
information is disclosed.”195 Trade secrecy, then, shifts the analysis to the context of 
disclosure, finding duties of confidentiality implied by the norms of those contexts. 
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Professor Sandeen gathered and analyzed the case law and found that a diverse array 
of relationships has given rise to implied confidentiality: employer and employee, 
purchaser and supplier, licensor and licensee, and between partners in joint ventures, 
among others.196 Trade secret cases also appreciate the role of norms created by these 
relationships rather than just the formalities themselves. As one court stated: “To 
give publicity, wantonly, to confidential correspondence, meets with the prompt re-
buke and merited condemnation of every one not lost to all honorable feeling. It is a 
death-blow to the best interests of civilized society itself . . . .”197 Lofty rhetoric aside, 
trade secret law appreciates norms of trust and confidentiality implied by certain so-
cial contexts. 
What is missing from trade secrecy’s approach to the problem of limited disclo-
sures, and why public use law cannot simply learn the lessons of “relative secrecy” 
and move on, is a model for solving the public use’s discrimination problem. Relative 
secrecy cases often involve corporate parties and, as Professor Sandeen has shown, 
the relationships that courts have so far recognized as giving rise to implied duties of 
confidentiality are business relationships. That confidentiality agreements are not re-
quired, in doctrine and in practice, is a step forward. But trade secrecy does not get 
us any further toward respecting the powerful confidentiality norms of networks of 
friends, solo entrepreneurs, part-time inventors, and hobbyists. A social network-
based doctrine of trust does just that. 
III. REORIENTING PUBLIC USE LAW  
Armed with the lessons of social networks and privacy-as-trust, we can return to 
the public use cases discussed above and summarized in Table I. Recall that some-
times, not having a confidentiality agreement in place has little-to-no effect on a pub-
lic use analysis: those cases tend to involve Cluster A (corporate) inventors, who, 
based on the twenty-five cases discussed above, usually win their public use cases. 
Other times, confidentiality agreements are essential, leading many Cluster B (solo 
entrepreneur) inventors to lose their public use cases.198 Even where Cluster A in-
ventors lose, courts’ tendencies to elevate formal secrecy agreements to near deter-
minative status is a boon: only inventors with the power and money of a large cor-
poration have the leverage to put nondisclosure commitments in writing and force 
their business partners to sign them.199 And where confidentiality agreements are 
missing, courts tend to be willing to fill the gap with the customs and norms of in-
dustry, but rarely do so with the more informal, yet no less powerful norms of solo 
inventors, hobbyists, and part-time innovators.200 In short, the application of the pub-
lic use bar is either haphazard, at best, or discriminatory, at worst, with no clear tools 
in the current doctrine to resolve the problem. The dominant theory of adjudication—
what privacy scholars would call privacy-as-control—lends itself to the harsh, bright 
line, and uneven application of the law. This raises the question of how to reform 
public use law to create more certainty, fairness, and justice.  
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Social network theory and privacy-as-trust offer a model for adjudicating public 
use cases. Using a totality of the circumstances test that focuses on the audience for 
a disclosure, the information’s complexity relative to that audience, and the relation-
ship between the inventor and the audience, the standard will comport with what we 
know about how and why individuals share information with others. In this Part, I 
revisit some of the leading public use cases discussed above and show how some 
would turn out the same, others would end differently, and the fate of others requires 
more information. Luckily, a network- and trust-oriented approach also lays out clear 
pathways for the admission of evidence, allowing appellate judges to remand cases 
with specific instructions for fact finding. I then respond to possible objections to 
applying privacy-as-trust to public use. 
A. Looking at the Cases Anew 
A case like Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp.,201 a Cluster A case, would come to the 
same result. The analysis would vary only slightly. In Xerox, a company employee 
invented a method that improved computer handwriting recognition.202 Concluding 
that the inventor’s submission of a videotape of himself demonstrating the invention 
to conference organizers as part of an application to present did not invalidate his 
patent, the court explained that the videotape was not a public use: no one, other than 
the inventor, had actually used anything.203 That can hardly be the rule in public use 
cases; cases like Baxter and Eolas Technologies v. Microsoft Corp. both found in-
validating public uses after mere demonstration by the inventor.204 But the court did 
rely on the norms, customs, and practices of the context of the disclosure. Although 
the inventor in Xerox did not include a secrecy agreement along with his submission, 
the court recognized that conference organizers keep submissions confidential as a 
matter of “professional courtesy and practice” and that they were under “a profes-
sional ethical obligation” to maintain secrecy.205  
This holding makes sense under a social network and trust model, as well. Given 
the relationship between the inventor and his audience, norms of trust can be implied: 
academic conference organizers generally do not reveal the details of submissions 
made to them. And even if the submission was sent to the two organizers who shared 
it with a selection committee, that audience was a close-knit closed network of strong 
ties. As such, the information was unlikely to jump from one small network to an-
other wider network. 
Under a social network and trust framework, Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, 
Inc.206 would come to the same result, but for very different reasons. Indeed, the 
analysis of this case highlights the chasm between the current doctrine and 
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application and shows how a social network approach honors the letter and spirit of 
the law.  
Moleculon seems to stand for the proposition that, as with trade secrets’ doctrine 
of “relative secrecy,”207 the relationship between the inventor and her audience mat-
ters for public use. A close look at the Federal Circuit’s reasoning shows that, in fact, 
the likelihood of confidentiality of close-knit networks was ignored. In Moleculon, 
an organic chemistry graduate student and puzzle enthusiast invented what we would 
now recognize as a device similar to a Rubik’s Cube.208 He developed various paper 
models of the device and showed them to close friends, two roommates, and a col-
league in the chemistry department. Once employed at Moleculon, the inventor left 
a wooden version on his desk, where his employer saw it and took an interest in it. 
After the inventor demonstrated how it worked, they jointly decided that Moleculon 
would try to market the device, at which point they sent a prototype to Parker 
Brothers and many other toy manufacturers.209 No one signed confidentiality agree-
ments. Nor, as far as we know, was there any overt discussion of secrecy. The maker 
of the Rubik’s Cube, which Moleculon alleged infringed the patent on its device, 
challenged the patent’s validity for public use: the inventor’s decision to show the 
device to his friends, roommates, colleagues, and boss, they argued, more than met 
public use’s publicity requirement. 
The Federal Circuit disagreed, but in so doing, although it professed to focus on 
the relationships between the parties involved in the disclosures, it really did no such 
thing. Rather, the court’s analysis looked at the volitional acts of the inventor, in line 
with the strict limits of privacy-as-control. The court suggested that “the personal 
relationships and other surrounding circumstances” gave rise to a “legitimate expec-
tation of privacy and of confidentiality” at all times.210 But, upon closer examination 
of the decision, it appears that the relationships did not matter. What mattered was 
that the inventor never physically gave his invention to anyone else and never 
evinced a commercial motive for his demonstrations. That he at all times retained 
physical possession was what distinguished this case from Egbert v. Lippmann,211 
the 1881 Supreme Court case where the Court said that an inventor made a public 
use of a corset when he gave it to his girlfriend to wear under her clothes. It could 
not have been the relationships between inventor and audience that distinguished 
Egbert; if anything, the implied confidentiality among lovers is stronger than be-
tween roommates and colleagues. The only thing that distinguishes Egbert is that, in 
Egbert, the inventor physically handed over the corset; in Moleculon, he kept it in 
his hands during the demonstration. The Federal Circuit also relied on the inventor’s 
lack of commercial intent in demonstrating his puzzle, reinforcing its focus on 
whether the inventor gave up control of the device.212 
Looking at Moleculon through the lens of privacy-as-trust would retain the result 
(a finding of nonpublic use), but employ an analysis far more open and transparent. 
Close friends and roommates, to whom the puzzle inventor demonstrated his device, 
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represent the kind of close-knit strong ties that recycle information within a network. 
They also have long histories of experience with each other, contributing to implied 
norms of confidentiality upon which individuals should be able to rely. Indeed, evi-
dence was admitted at trial that “[a]ll who may have seen the model were intimate 
friends of [the inventor] and he would have been ‘astonished if any of them had felt 
free to do something with . . . the idea . . . .’”213 What’s more, these friends, 
roommates, and colleagues, some of whom were fellow chemists, were not engineers 
or puzzle experts: merely showing them a series of cubes with rotating blocks would 
not have allowed them to reverse engineer the device. Therefore, given the audi-
ence’s relationship to the subject matter of the invention, the information disclosed 
was complex and of the type unlikely to be easily transmitted outside the network 
via weak ties. Social network and trust theory suggest that the inventor’s demonstra-
tions were not public. 
And JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc. would, like the court found, result in a 
finding of public use under privacy-as-trust. The invention—protective netting 
around a trampoline214—is simple to understand and easy to transmit by the weak 
ties (neighbors) that used it in the inventor’s backyard. Although norms of trust can 
indeed develop among acquaintances, additional evidence would likely show little 
basis for trust. This suggests that the invention could be disseminated to other net-
works beyond just the inventor’s neighbors.  
The real power of privacy-as-trust, though, is evident from the cases where results 
and reasoning would change, best illustrated by a Cluster B case, Beachcombers In-
ternational, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Products, Inc.,215 and a Cluster A case, 
Honeywell International Inc. v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp.216 In Beachcomb-
ers, the Federal Circuit found that demonstration of a new kaleidoscope at the de-
signer’s home constituted invalidating public use.217 The court was not clear about 
its reasoning; the lack of any analysis may suggest that the court was simply relying 
on the lack of any confidentiality agreement.218 At a minimum, it is clear that the 
court ignored the social context of disclosure. The invite-only party was at the de-
signer’s private home and gathered twenty to thirty of her friends for the express 
purpose of soliciting feedback.219 Despite the lack of any formal secrecy agreement, 
social network and trust theory would conclude that what happened at the cocktail 
party was not public use. The audience members were her friends, many of whom 
likely fall into the strong-tie category and engender norms of confidentiality; addi-
tional evidence could be admitted to describe the audience in more detail. In any 
event, that those in attendance were the designer’s social friends suggests that the 
technology of the kaleidoscope was relatively complex to them, making it the type 
of information that does not travel well through weak ties. Therefore, even if the 
invitees included some acquaintances or weak ties, the details of the invention would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 213. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1420, 1425 (D. Del. 1984), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part, 793 F.2d 1261 (ellipses in original) (quoting trial transcript at 897). 
 214. JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc., 191 Fed. App’x. 926, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 215. 31 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 216. 448 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 217. Beachcombers, 31 F.3d at 1160. 
 218. See id. 
 219. Id.  
594 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:557 
 
be unlikely to travel well from network to network. Nor should we ignore the fact 
that the alleged public use took place at the designer’s home, a paradigmatic private 
context,220 which not only makes further information diffusion even less likely, but 
also contributes to the emergence of reliable norms of confidentiality. 
The result in Honeywell would also change. That case involved Honeywell’s ter-
rain warning system,221 which helped prevent pilots from flying into mountains and 
which was demonstrated to potential customers and a reporter more than one year 
before patenting.222 The Federal Circuit found no public use because all demonstra-
tions could be considered experimental. That rationale rings hollow: the demonstra-
tions were for customers—more than 150 of them223—who, the court admitted, 
would be purchasing the technology in the future.224 It was more important to the 
court that Honeywell personnel conducted the demonstrations and “maintained con-
trol over them,”225 even though it is hard to imagine who else would be conducting 
the test runs. To make these demonstrations seem relatively private, the district court 
emphasized that there was no indication that the general public ever became aware 
of the technology.226 That a reporter was on board was irrelevant. 
Social network and trust theory would conclude, from the totality of the circum-
stances, that Honeywell engaged in public use. The audience for its disclosure in-
cluded members of the aviation industry who were likely going to purchase the sys-
tem and a former pilot and aviation reporter who subsequently wrote an article about 
the technology. These are precisely the kind of weak ties that could both understand 
the technology and disseminate it; indeed, the writer’s job is to disseminate the in-
formation. There is also no indication, unlike, say, in Bernhardt,227 that the norms 
and customs of the aviation industry ensure that all parties share the burden of keep-
ing information confidential. Additional evidence about industry norms and practice 
could be admitted to buttress or challenge that conclusion. 
There are undoubtedly some closer calls, but additional evidence could help us 
apply the social network and trust model. In Lough, for example, where a boat re-
pairman installed his new device on his friends’ boats,228 we would want to know 
more about these friends, their history with the inventor, and their proficiency with 
boat hardware and technology. We would also want to know whether others at the 
marina saw the invention and had enough time, know-how, and opportunity to copy 
it. In National Research Development Corp., where the inventor’s academic adviser 
disclosed his student’s invention to an acquaintance at an academic conference,229 
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applying social network and trust theory would require additional evidence about the 
relationship between the parties. But this type of evidence is easily admitted, and the 
detour into social science is well worth the added fairness benefits. 
In the end, social network and trust theory offer a fair and administrable approach 
to public use cases. The proposal resembles trade secrecy’s relative secrecy doctrine, 
brings intellectual property’s respect for social networks to a forgotten corner of 
patent law, and, in so doing, treats corporate and solo inventors equally and gives 
everyone a chance to contribute to the innovation economy. In some situations, cases 
would have come to different results under privacy-as-trust. But for most cases, the 
doctrine provides a robust intellectual foundation for reasoning through public use 
questions and helps ensure honest application of what was always meant to be a 
flexible standard for patent validity. 
B. Responses to Potential Objections 
Some might object to the structure or mode of analysis of privacy-as-trust as too 
indeterminate and inappropriate for patent law. Others might focus on the results, 
suggesting that the proposal would encourage risky business behavior and cut off 
more knowledge from the public domain, thus running counter to the goals of patent 
law. I respond to these objections in turn. 
A totality of the circumstances test, one might argue, is too flexible and too inde-
terminate, providing too much discretion, too few guidelines, and no way to prevent 
a judge from imposing his personal preferences on a given case. This is a common 
refrain in diverse areas of law,230 but it rings hollow in this case. Totality of the cir-
cumstances tests, in general, allow fair and individual determinations of fact-specific 
cases. They are in use across intellectual property regimes.231 And even under the 
current standard, public use cases are supposed to be highly fact specific, depending 
on the inventor’s actions, the details of the disclosure, and whether she had the fore-
sight and leverage to mandate nondisclosure. What’s more, the very deficiencies 
identified in this Article—discriminatory application of public use law to privilege 
corporate inventors over solo entrepreneurs—stem not from a boundless totality of 
the circumstances test, but a misapplication of the law through a bright-line 
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privacy-as-control standard.232 Although bright-line rules are undoubtedly more 
definite, this Article’s social network and trust approach comes with clear guidelines 
that limit the analysis to only relevant factors: the social context of disclosure, the 
information disclosed, and the relationships between the audience and the inventor 
and the audience and the information.233 
A second structural objection to this Article’s social network and trust proposal is 
that it imports a doctrine from unrelated areas of law and social science that address 
problems and policies distinct from patent law. I disagree. Not only did Sam Warren 
and Louis Brandeis refer to the doctrinal and theoretical relationships between intel-
lectual property and privacy law more than 125 years ago,234 distinguished scholars 
in both fields have been learning lessons from each other ever since.235 Indeed, para-
phrasing Jonathan Zittrain’s powerful argument, the “problem” of privacy and intel-
lectual property is the same: information flow.236 In privacy, individuals seek to pro-
tect the dissemination of personal data; many privacy questions concern the wrongful 
disclosure of intimate information. The public use bar addresses a similar matter 
—namely, the diffusion of information about an invention via first-person disclosure. 
To answer these questions, both fields seek a way to draw the boundary between 
public and private after an initial, limited disclosure. Considering similar approaches, 
therefore, makes sense. 
The final two objections concern the practical implications of employing a social 
network and trust approach to public use. Some might argue that by recognizing the 
norms of confidentiality of informal relationships between friends and intimates, this 
Article’s proposal would result in more findings of nonpublic use. But allowing more 
inventors to use their devices without the voluminous disclosures required in a patent 
application would run counter to the central goal of patent law, which is the 
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disclosure of knowledge to the public.237 This argument misreads the data and misses 
the point of privacy-as-trust. As discussed above, some public and nonpublic use 
cases would come to same results under a social network and trust approach. The 
proposal is merely a mode of analysis that also addresses inequality in the application 
of current public use law. If it does result in more solo entrepreneurs being allowed 
to retain their patents, so be it: the PTO has already recognized the need to improve 
access by part-time inventors and hobbyists,238 and the progress of science and tech-
nology in society, the salient and overarching purpose of the patent system,239 could 
only benefit. 
Some may argue, too, that even if secrecy commitments are not always possible, 
codifying norms of confidentiality as adequate replacements encourages risky be-
havior. The law, the argument continues, should incentivize corporate and solo en-
trepreneurs alike to take every necessary precaution to secure their inventions, and 
downplaying confidentiality agreements does the opposite. I resist the temptation to 
use a discriminatory weapon as a paternalistic tool, especially one that has a disparate 
impact on entrepreneurs. Focusing on the context of disclosure encourages risky be-
havior no more than privacy law does when it allows individuals to rely on their 
legitimate expectations of privacy. And the elevation of confidentiality agreements 
to near determinative status is less a tool of social policy than a giveaway to corporate 
entities that have the leverage to employ them. What’s more, as evidenced by its Pro 
Se Assistance Program240 and Law School Clinic Program,241 the PTO already be-
lieves that solo entrepreneurs deserve a chance to access the innovation economy 
without having to meet some of the same demands as corporate inventors. A social 
network and trust model for public use, therefore, does not so much encourage bad 
behavior as implement an egalitarian approach to patentability. 
CONCLUSION 
Current public use law tends to privilege corporate inventors over solo entrepre-
neurs. It does so by employing a privacy-as-control model for determining when a 
prepatenting disclosure or use was sufficiently public to invalidate a patent, elevating 
confidentiality agreements to near determinative status and respecting the confiden-
tiality norms of industry while ignoring the different, yet equally as powerful norms 
of individuals. This Article proposes a new way of thinking through and adjudicating 
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public use cases by employing a privacy-as-trust model. This approach recognizes 
that disclosure is a contextual, fact-specific social phenomenon that can only be eval-
uated through the lens of social science, specifically social network theory and trust. 
An administrable model that focuses on the social context of disclosure, the relation-
ship between the inventor and her audience, and the relationships between the 
audience and the information disclosure is proposed, as well. As applied, privacy-as-
trust may change results in some cases, but more importantly, it will provide a 
coherent, predictable, and fair method for analyzing public use cases. 
Research into the role of social network theory and trust, in general, and in intel-
lectual property law, specifically, must continue. With respect to public use, this 
Article has not considered questions of institutional competence, or whether judges 
or juries are more capable of the social science analysis proposed herein. As for other 
questions across the intellectual property spectrum, future scholarship will tease out 
the role of social networks and trust in trademark, copyright, and trade secret law. 
And the importance of trust in other areas of law must be teased out, a project on 
which several scholars are already engaged. Needless to say, this Article is one step 
in a larger research journey. But when it comes to public use law, social network and 
trust theory offer a practical, egalitarian, and honest way forward.  
 
